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Abstract A brief account on the development of proba-
bility theory and statistics is given. These subjects may
help the chemist to interpret the information content of his
experimental data. Their source and validity, however, is
often unclear. A series of papers, of which this is the first,
intends to present a clearer view by illustrating the origin of
the data-analysis tools. The major figures in this field are
mentioned, their achievements presented and the mutual
links outlined. The intention is the provision of a common
basis for the discussion of statistical aspects relevant to
metrology in chemistry. The chemist should see probability
theory and statistics as tools to assist in the daily practice of
data interpretation to arrive at an objective conclusion.
Keywords Probability theory  Statistics  Determinism 
Pearson  Neyman  Fisher
Introduction
‘‘I often say that when you can measure what you are
speaking about and express it in numbers, you know
something about it. And when you cannot measure it,
when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge
is meager and of unsatisfactory kind. It may be the
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your
thought, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the
matter be’’ [1]. This famous statement of the physicist
Lord Kelvin certainly ignores some achievements of
biology and geology but illustrates strikingly the focus on
numbers and mathematical formulations in the sciences.
These imply precision, clarity, and unambiguity. Galilei’s
statement ‘‘if I were again beginning my studies, I would
follow the advice of Plato and start with mathematics’’
combines two major names in history of human intellect
in their appreciation of mathematics. Mathematics imply
purity, symmetry, harmony, and truth. These elements
describe what human lives lack. Human life is unstable
and, for sure, unpredictable. Despite expressing itself in
the language of mathematics with numbers and formulas,
statistics does not have a reputation similar to that of, e.g.,
geometry and arithmetic, or physics. ‘‘Statistics—the
curse of the analytical classes’’ is the title of an article on
the use and abuse of statistics in papers devoted to ana-
lytical chemistry [2]. Science (from the Latin ‘‘scire’’: to
know) is devoted to knowledge. Statistics is devoted to
doubt and uncertainty. Hence the subjects seem to have
conflicting (if not mutually exclusive) objectives. There
are numerous jokes (and less joking quotes) about sta-
tistics and statisticians. Isn’t it foolish to study uncertainty
and doubt when all the scientific world craves for cer-
tainty? Knowledge and uncertainty are opposite faces of
the same medal. One cannot go without the other.
Objectivity in proposing a scientific hypothesis also
requires a statement on the relevant aspects the hypothesis
cannot cover.
‘‘It is the primary task of statistics intended for scientific
use to convince oneself and others that the data have been
interpreted fairly’’ [3]. No learned person would reject
statistics as a useless or even stupid subject. Nevertheless,
when his arguments are commented on with reference to
statistics, the predominant reaction is depreciation. Or
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helplessness when advice on certain aspects of a data set is
given in terms of statistics. The reasons for these reactions
lie, in part, in the lack of formal education of most chemists
in statistics. In many cases statistical knowledge reduces to
mean value and standard deviation. Few are able to
explain, e.g., the meaning of degrees of freedom. The
meaning of the correlation coefficient in linear regression
[4–7] is another practical example of the role of statistical
properties in chemistry. Despite its rather poor perfor-
mance, the correlation coefficient is regularly found in
chemical communications for the purpose of underscoring
the quality of the data presented. The other situation is the
frustration in the eyes of a chemist seeking advice on his/
her data interpretation. Modern statistical techniques, e.g.
computer-intensive statistics, non-parametric statistics, and
classification techniques including factor analysis, are
widely unknown. It is not the primary objective of this
paper, the first in a series, to remedy the situation. How-
ever, metrologists have the task of communicating the
magnitude of doubt associated with a set of measurement
values. And doubt is one subject where statistics can make
a helpful contribution—if some basic understanding of the
history and methods of this important field of data analysis
are available. No science can escape the stamp of time
which coins its progress and its language. Therefore this
paper deals mainly with history. To focus the vast subject,
the development of statistics through the centuries will be
described on the basis of eminent contributions. The pre-
sentation is necessarily subjective.
A highly abbreviated history on probability
and statistics
Arguably, statistics does not have its basis in pondering
doubt and probability, but in data collection. The words
‘‘statistics’’ and ‘‘state’’ do have the same linguistic roots.
The oldest scriptures are telling not about gods but about
goods. The administrators of the first complex human
social structures had to document tax laws and their
implementation by citizens. Thus the libraries of cuneiform
writings in Khorsabhad and Ninive (established in Meso-
potamia about 1000–500 BC) did not predominantly
forward artistic literature like the Gilgamesh Epic but
heaps of clay panels holding the number of crop bushels
delivered to the ruler’s stores and the tributes received from
conquered neighbors. The initially pictorial symbols used
to denote these quantities eventually developed into script.
In a world where life was short and instability prevailed,
human concepts about the surrounding world were handed
down orally as myths. Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are
prominent examples from the Achaian period of Greek
history (eighth century BC). A major achievement of
pre-Socratic philosophers in Greece (fifth century BC) was
to separate rational reasoning from myth. Prior to this, the
gods and their deeds were as real as are electrons and
molecules in our times. Logical reflection about this world
(as perceived by the five senses) provided evidence that
some events can be predicted while in other cases the event
cannot be known beforehand. In order to know, one must
try. In Latin, to try is ‘‘probare’’ and from this the word
‘‘probabilitas’’ is derived. The earliest documentation of
this word comes from Cicero [8] and connects what usually
happens with what is ordinarily believed [9]. From the
subjective interpretation of probability to a mathematically
founded probability theory was a long journey, and one
which had many sideways dead-ends. Thus, it is easier to
say where mathematical probabilities did not come from
than the opposite [10]. Where chance rules, determinism
was sought—and found in the seemingly eternal stability of
the stars. Here was predictability, stability, and harmony.
At least, if the outcome of an event is uncertainty, one
wants to know what the likely outcomes might be or what
could expected. In fact, for lasting years during early
modern times chance was discussed usually in connection
with expectation E:
pV ¼ E ð1Þ
where p is the probability of the event, V its outcome value,
and E the expectation (note: this is a historic definition of
expectation). If the probability p of obtaining an outcome
of V = 100 € is 0.1, then the expectation E is 10 €. In
relationship expressed by Eq. (1) probability has changed
from a term expressing personal belief into a
(dimensionless) quantity. It may, therefore, not be
surprising that the first text offering a mathematical
formulation for probability was in terms of what players
in a game should get. Huygens’ ‘‘De ratiociniis in ludo
aleae’’ [11] was published briefly after Blaise Pascal and
Pierre de Fermat exchanged letters over a question
nowadays known as the ‘‘problem of points’’. The
question was posed by A. Gombaud Chevalier de Me´re´:
two players P1 and P2 agree to play a series of fair games
until one of them has won a specified number N of games.
The play is suddenly interrupted. P1 has won N1 games and
P2 N2 games. How should the stakes be divided? A series
of publications on probabilities was initiated, from
Graunt’s ‘‘Observations on the Bills of Mortality’’ [12] to
Bernoulli’s ‘‘Ars Conjectandi’’ [13]. Graunt’s work on
mortality tables, together with Halley’s similar work using
data of the City of Breslau, reminds us that probability was
seen as a subject of science but not primarily as a tool for
science. The ‘‘Ars Conjectandi’’ was published
posthumously in 1713 and contains, in addition to an
annotated version of Huygens’ treatise, a proof of
Newton’s binomial theorem,
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an application of Eq. (2) to games with dice and an outline
of possible uses in civilian, moral, and economic matters
(developing the (weak) law of large numbers). Experi-
mental science was just at its beginning. The first natural
law (on acceleration) was formulated by Galilei in
approximately 1610. The great period of systematic
experimentation was just to start. Nevertheless, Galilei
emphasized in the ‘‘Discorsi’’ [14] that measurement
results cannot be arbitrarily exact
From the data collected during the eighteenth century on
such diverse subjects as birth, death, crime, and the
movement of stars it became evident that chance follows
rules. De Moivre even mentioned the error law Eq. (3)
N ¼ 1
r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p expð ðx  lÞ
2
2r2
Þ ð3Þ
in 1733 even though its basis remained enigmatic. Bayes’
posthumously published treatise ‘‘An essay towards
solving a problem in the doctrine of chances’’ [15] laid
the foundations of what is known today as conditional
probabilities. In its simple form Bayes’ theorem is given by
Eq. (4)
PðAjBÞ ¼ PðAÞ PðBjAÞ
PðAÞ PðBjAÞ þ PðA0ÞPðBjA0Þ : ð4Þ
where events A and B have probabilities of P(A) and P(B),
respectively. A0 is the complementary event of A. The
symbol P(A|B) denotes a conditional probability, that is a
probability that event A occurs provided event B occurred.
The importance of the theorem can be appreciated from
both the terms P(A|B) and P(B|A). If the conditional
probability P(B|A) is known but P(A|B) is required, Eq. (4)
provides a way to obtain it. Bayes’ theorem, despite its
importance, often remains obscure to people for several
reasons. First the concept of ‘‘conditional probability’’ is
unknown to most chemists. Further, it is clear that in case
of independent (unconditional) events the probability of
observing the two events A with probability P(A) and B
with probability P(B) is P(A)P(B) but ‘‘conditional prob-
ability’’ is less clear. Therefore, a brief example may
illustrate its importance.
Consider an immunoassay. The immunoassay will be
positive in presence of a doping substance in 99% of cases.
Only in 1% of the cases where no drug is present the
immunoassay will be positive (so-called false-positive
result). The percentage of samples to the laboratory actu-
ally contaminated with the drug is, say, 1%. The question
of interest is: if the immunoassay indicates contamination
with doping drug, what will be the probability that the
sample is actually contaminated? This is a simple example
because only two possibilities exist. The probability P(A)
that a sample holds the doping drug is 0.01. The probability
that the immunoassay is positive if the sample is contam-
inated is 0.99. The probability P(A0) that the sample is not
contaminated is (1 - P(A)) = 0.99. The probability
P(B|A0) that the immunoassay is positive despite the fact
the sample is clean is 0.01. Hence we have
PðAjBÞ ¼ 0:01  0:99 = ðð0:01  0:99Þ
þ ð0:99  0:01ÞÞ
¼ 0:5: ð5Þ
The result can be presented in another way. Of 10,000
samples, only 100 are contaminated (and 99 of these are
detected by the immunoassay). 9,900 samples are not
contaminated. Of these 9,900 samples, 1% are falsely
detected positive. i.e. 99 samples. Hence, if the
immunoassay forwards a positive result, it is correct in
only 50% of the cases. This example may also illustrate the
importance of the presumption of innocence. It is also
important to recognize that Bayes’ theorem is valid
irrespective of whether frequencies or subjective
probabilities are used. Bayes’ theorem plays an important
role if the probabilities are of a subjective nature. If there
are assumptions about the distribution of the outcome A
(say a measurand in a measurement), these assumptions can
be expressed by a probability function f(A). This function is
the prior. If some measurements on A are performed, new
data D are available and the distribution L(A|D) needs to be
evaluated (the likelihood function). Using Eq. (4) with
P(A) = f(A) and P(B|A) = L(A|D), the posterior function
P(A|D) can be obtained. It represents the new information
about the distribution of the measured values given the new
data D. The numerator is usually chosen to ensure that the
area under the distribution P(A|D) is unity. Calculating with
distributions is usually not simple and, in its time, Bayes’
theorem was mostly ignored. Nowadays, with computers at
hand for numerical integration, Bayes’ theorem is receiving
increasing attention [16–18].
Probability theory around 1750 concentrated on mor-
tality, life insurance, and annuities. Statistics contributed to
the social field—including gambling. Leibnitz considered
probability theory as a mathematical version of legal rea-
soning. It is, at this stage, important to understand that
probability and chance only referred to limited human
knowledge. The world itself was deterministic. Given the
initial constraints were known, all future development was
thought to be predictable. On this basis, Laplace analyzed
the seemingly odd behavior of the planets Jupiter and
Saturn [19], thereby not only illustrating the stability of the
solar system but also introducing new mathematical con-
cepts (e.g. the term ‘‘potential’’ and the Laplace operator).
His treatise on probability [20] became a cornerstone of
Accred Qual Assur (2008) 13:3–9 5
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probability theory. Before Laplace, probability theory was
solely concerned with mathematical analysis of games of
chance. Laplace applied probabilistic ideas to many sci-
entific and practical problems. The theory of errors,
actuarial mathematics, and statistical mechanics are
examples of some of the important applications of proba-
bility theory developed in the nineteenth century.
For metrologists, the period between 1760 and 1810 is
of special significance. Laplace, like Lavoisier, was a
member of the Metrological Commission founded in 1791
to establish unified standards for weight and measures. The
foundations of what today has developed into the SI were
laid in these times. From these times also came the rec-
ognition that chance follows laws. For one, the mortality
tables proved the constancy of female and male birth rates
and Gauss [21] gave an elegant proof of Eq. (3), nowadays
known as the Gaussian distribution. In between, the
expeditions sent out to measure the Paris meridian [22]
accomplished their goal [23] and, eventually, established
internationally recognized references like the meter, the
kilogram, and the second. Even though probability theory
and science went separately, the laws of chance and
probability were developed in parallel to the extremely
deterministic natural laws of Galilei and Newton. In the
nineteenth century scientists were searching for laws,
causality, and prediction. Probability theory, however, did
not provide a sufficient basis for any conclusion about
individual events. While one faction of the 19th centuries
probabilists focused on the mean values of their observa-
tions (e.g. crime, marriages, suicides, birth, death) thereby
discovering surprising stability, the other faction studied
variation revealing fluctuation incompatible with pure
chance. Still, measurement data did not play a role in
probability theory. The leaders in probability theory in the
nineteenth century concentrated on eugenics [24]. Eugenics
deals with interference to improve the human gene pool.
Galton invented the term ‘‘eugenics’’ and wrote the first
book on the subject [25]. Galton also invented linear
regression and pioneered the use of the Gaussian distri-
bution, Eq. (3), to interpret histograms of collected data.
Galton’s successor was Karl Pearson. Pearson is a co-
founder of psychology and biometry. His contributions on
statistics should be known to almost all scientists—he is
the originator of the correlation coefficient [26], the v2
goodness-of-fit test [27], and the method of moments [28].
The institution created by Galton at University College,
London, became an Institute of Applied Statistics in 1911.
The institute attracted further excellence, e.g. Pearson’s son
Egon, Jerzy Neyman, John Wishart, and Ronald Fisher.
The often recipe-like application of numerical operations to
derive certain figures of merit (mean value, standard
deviation, confidence limits, significance tests) is based
on the work of statisticians from Galton to Fisher. A
considerable part of Fisher’s scientific work is accessible at
the University of Adelaide Digital Library [29].
Pearson, Neyman and Fisher
Egon Pearson, Jerzy Neyman, and Ronald Fisher shaped
what is known to many chemists as ‘‘the statistics’’. The
terms ‘‘statistical model’’, ‘‘hypothesis testing’’ [30, 31],
‘‘Null hypothesis’’, ‘‘Type I error’’, ‘‘Type II error’’, and
‘‘significance test’’ are some of those introduced by the
London group. Unfortunately, despite (or because of) their
close work on the same subject, the personal relationship
among them was rather poor. A consequence is that a real
synopsis of the different views (Neyman/Pearson, Fisher,
Bayes) and their specific developments is not available.
While statistical methods gradually entered many scientific
fields, the in part controversial views of the originators of
the methods were ignored or, even worse, mishmashed. It
is not uncommon that some of the present readers are
reading the names of Pearson, Neyman, and perhaps even
Fisher here for the first time. Original literature, where
important concepts are developed and not seldom contro-
versially discussed, is rarely referred to. Instead the various
approaches are often mixed and the underlying concepts
almost ignored. The Neyman/Pearson school compares
hypotheses [32] while the Fisherian school uses the sig-
nificance test [33]. The implications are subtle and often
confusing. Fisher significance tests are widely required in
medical and other literature and are often applied
mechanically [34]. The significance test seems to be
favored over hypothesis testing, because only one
hypothesis (the Null hypothesis stating that the observed
effect is due to random variation) is tested against the data.
Here, the only possible error is a Type I error: The effect is
accepted as significant despite being random. This risk can
be reduced by choosing a small test criterion p. The
hypothesis test compares the Null hypothesis against its
alternative. Two types of error are possible—a Type I error
that the effect is accepted despite being random must be
balanced against the Type II error to reject an effect as
random despite being significant. R. Fisher moved to Ro-
thamstead Agricultural Station in 1919. Most of the
popularization of his statistical methods was done during
this time, especially via his textbooks [35–37].
In Rothamstead a large number of data awaited analysis.
Typical studies asked for the effect of some substance on
biomass production. Which fertilizer is better? What crop-
rotation system works better for what kind of soil? Such
questions were highly relevant economically. But how to
address them? Fisher’s answer was randomization, analysis
of variance (ANOVA), maximum likelihood, and the the-
oretical concepts of efficiency and sufficiency. Here is no
6 Accred Qual Assur (2008) 13:3–9
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space to fully appreciate the contribution of Fisher who, in
addition to his statistical work, continued to contribute to
eugenics and genetics. It is, however, almost impossible to
overestimate Fisher’s impact: ‘‘Fisher was a genius who
almost single-handedly created the foundations for modern
statistical science ….’’ [38].
Kolmogorov and the theoretical foundation
of probability
This sweep through the concepts of probability would be
incomplete without a reference to A.N. Kolmogorov. The
name Kolmogorov is, today, mainly associated with the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test [39]. However, Kolmogorov
provided an axiomatic basis of the properties the concept of
probability should have [40]. Probability is a very old
concept but, as will be summarized below, a concept which
has multiple meanings. To give an example, classical
probability calculus introduced by, e.g., Bernoulli [13] and
de Moivre [41], gives the probability of an event as a ratio
of equally likely cases that favor it to the total number of
equally likely cases possible under the circumstances. The
‘‘equally likely case’’ was important. In play, ‘‘equally
likely’’ also means fair. Introducing probability in terms of
urn models (as usually practiced in school education) is
also implicitly based on the assumptions that any draw
from the urn is equally likely. It should be noted in passing
that this classical approach led to some paradoxes, e.g. the
Bertrand paradoxes [42]. Kolmogorov based probability on
set theory. An event is a set from a measurable space (note:
‘‘measurable set’’ is a general mathematical concept
implying that certain properties of the set can be quanti-
fied). Measure theory assigns to each set of a field of sets a
number between 0 and 1, its probability. This setting seems
simple but develops into a complex mathematical structure.
Striking analogies exist, e.g., between expectation and the
integral over the set or orthogonality of functions and
independence of random variables. Two principles were
offered to connect probabilities P(X) with reality. First, if
an experiment E is repeated a large number of times, the
relative frequency of event X will differ very slightly from
P(X). Second, if P(X) is very small, one can be practically
certain that when E is carried out only once, the event X
will not occur at all [43]. Thus, the primitive notion of the
probability was related to first principles.
Frequentists, Bayesians and the different meanings
of probability
All the previous discussions would be of limited impor-
tance to metrologists if the situation concerning the
fundamentals of science had not changed radically at the
beginning of the twentieth century. One reason for that is
quantum theory. Kolmogorov, like Fisher, was a frequen-
tist. To a frequentist the probability of an event is equal to
its relative occurrence in a larger number of repetitions of
an experiment. Thus, the repeatability of an experiment is
an essential element in the application of statistical tools.
As co-worker at the agricultural station at Rothamstead and
in his eugenic studies, Fisher had access to a large number
of data. It was clear, especially after the contributions of
Gosset [44], that the law of large numbers required a larger
number of repetitions of an experiment if the power of a
significance test was not to be compromised. In the social
sciences, also, the sample size was usually larger than
about 30. Fisher insisted on the use of frequencies because
these were based on actually observed/measured data.
These data formed the closest connection with reality
available. And reality was, still, deterministic. Thus,
compared with the subjective probabilities of Laplace, the
frequentist approach appeared to be a major progress in the
direction of objectivity. During the 19th century, Laplace
was the authority on the use of probability: ‘‘It is remark-
able that a science which began with the consideration of
games of chance has become the most important object of
human knowledge’’ [20]. He suggested a subjective inter-
pretation of probability along Bayes’ theorem. His famous
quote: ‘‘Probability theory is nothing but common sense
reduced to calculation’’ is an account to this position. It is
also worth noting that the major statistical tool in the 19th
century, the least-squares method, was not a subject of
dispute, because it can be derived by sampling theory
approaches, on the basis of maximum likelihood, and by
Bayesian inference with the same final result. The dispute
between subjectivists and frequentists is, nevertheless, still
vivid [45].
Quantum mechanics gradually brought probability the-
ory into physics and chemistry [46]. Determinism faded
and with it, the close relationship between reality and
measurement data. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle
introduced chance to the so-called exact sciences and the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum chemistry made
clear that experimenter and experiment are never inde-
pendent of each other [47]. Probability theory is still
expanding, e.g. in biology, genetics, politics, economics,
physiology, and psychology. So, it may be expected that at
some future date a unified interpretation of probability will
become available. However, there are at least three dif-
ferent interpretations of probability. To Laplace and his
contemporaries probability was a state of mind. Another
view defines probability as an essentially unanalyzable but
intuitively understandable logical relationship between
propositions. There must be a logical intuition of the
probable relationships between evidence and conclusions,
Accred Qual Assur (2008) 13:3–9 7
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the latter becomes a subject of ‘‘rational belief’’ [48]. The
third view rests on the concept of frequency which
emerged during the 19th century.
Variation, uncertainty, and metrology
It seems possible that the three different views turn out as
different facets of the same gem. Probability is a rational
concept to deal with doubt. If the doubt can be quantified
on a rational basis, better (whatever the criterion for
‘‘better’’ may be) decisions can be made. If the likely
outcomes of an experiment are pondered, the information
available on the experiment and the conditions under which
the experiment is performed play a role in assessing, e.g.,
the risks of the experiment. The fact that circumstances,
even at the highest level of control, cannot be predictable to
an arbitrary degree, gives weight to the aspects of variation
and associated uncertainty. What is the likely outcome if
the experiment is repeated? If it is repeated under different
circumstances? What can be concluded if many indepen-
dent outcomes from an experiment are available, i.e. from
round-robin tests? It is common to search for answers to
these questions with statistics. The Gaussian distribution
(Eq. 3) is the almost undisputed (and unchecked) model for
data variance [49–51]. It is, however, also evident that the
data interpreted by metrologists, the data forwarded by
metrologists, and the quality assurance of the data for-
warded by metrologists, are not Gaussian or, at least,
should not expected a priori to be a sample from a Gaussian
distribution. Metrologists care about the quality of data
which are measured. The uncritical interpretation of mea-
surement values in terms of Gaussian distributions (which
is already implied by the evaluation of a measurement
uncertainty, uc, which is symmetric with the reported
measurement value, and the use of k = 2 as expansion
factor) does have its own risks. It is important to under-
stand the rationale in the use of the Gaussian distribution
and its limitations in order not to compromise the metro-
logical intentions, e.g. to warrant traceability. There are
alternatives. Simulation, e.g. by Monte Carlo methods, is
one possibility, rarely encountered in metrological
approaches in chemical measurement. Another possibility
is the use of robust estimators [52] or non-parametric
statistics.
Conclusions
Reporting measurement results without a statement about
their likely variability is an anachronism. For some time
the complexity of chemical measurements could be used as
an excuse. Nowadays, the computer is a valuable tool in
generating uncertainty estimates. How to do that (the
procedures) must be a field of active research when taking
a metrological approach to chemical measurement. In
practice the willingness to request and to provide a state-
ment of measurement uncertainty by the stakeholders in the
field is currently rather low. This reluctance may be
explained by inertia [53]. From observation during the past
15 years of performing research on statistical/metrological
properties of complex chemical measurements [54] it must
be concluded that the fear of having to deal with details of
statistics is at least an additional obstacle.
This very brief summary intends to provide a ‘‘golden
thread’’ through the development of probability theory and
statistics. The reader is encouraged to use these comments
and the information provided by the references as a starting
point for an independent journey through statistics. Sta-
tistics is an active field of research. The existence of a
mathematical basis for the interpretation of probability (a
basis for theoretical statistics) does not preclude the exis-
tence of three different interpretations of probability. It
should be emphasized that the concept of probability, in its
beginnings, was purely heuristic. The latin word ‘‘probare’’
means ‘‘to try’’ and therefore carries an essentially empir-
ical notion. Thus it does not offer a consistent axiomatic
building free of contradictions. The tools predominantly
used by chemists are founded in the theory of errors
established during nineteenth century. To appreciate the
differences between the various schools, the reader may
study the controversy between the Fisherian and the
Pearson/Neyman approach to statistical inference as an
example. In general, study of the original papers is highly
encouraged.
Further papers will deal with the Gaussian distribution
and its properties and with least-squares regression, cor-
relation, and robust statistics. With a basic understanding
of the rationale behind expansion factors and standard
deviations, the discussion of practical aspects, e.g. the
combination of measurement values obtained from profi-
ciency tests, will hopefully become more efficient.
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